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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEE R. MEYERS, 
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , 
v s . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n of 
t h e S t a t e of U t a h , 
Defendant and Appellant. 
C a s e No . 8 6 0 1 4 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. I s a l e t t e r from t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t , n o t i f y i n g a 
c o m p l a i n i n g c i t i z e n of t h e r e s u l t s of an i n t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
an " a d m i s s i o n a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t " in a s u b s e q u e n t c i v i l t o r t s u i t 
f o r t h e a l l e g e d l y t o r t i o u s c o n d u c t of t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r ? 
2. I s an i n t e r n a l p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n of 
a l l e g e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r m i s c o n d u c t (which i s u n d e r t a k e n f o r t h e 
p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t an o f f i c e r ' s a c t i o n s 
w a r r a n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o c i v i l s e r v i c e 
r e g u l a t i o n s ) c o n s i d e r e d t o have t h e same s t a n d a r d s and e l e m e n t s 
a s t o r t n e g l i g e n c e , so t h a t an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i n d i n g of p o l i c e 
m i s c o n d u c t i s a l s o an a d m i s s i o n of t o r t l i a b i l i t y ? 
3 . I s t h e e v i d e n t i a r y v a l u e of t h e r e s u l t s of an i n t e r n a l 
po l i ce inves t iga t ion of alleged pol ice off icer misconduct 
(undertaken for administrat ive purposes) outweighed by "unfair 
pre judice" , "confusion of issues" and "misleading the ju ry" , so 
t ha t i t should have been excluded fron evidence under Rule 404 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
4. Does public policy (which requires prompt, f a i r and open 
inves t iga t ions of alleged police misconduct by supe r io r s ) , give 
the City a p r iv i lege or j u s t i f i c a t i o n to i n s i s t tha t findings of 
police of f icer misconduct and any sanctions imposed against an 
o f f i ce r be excluded from evidence in a subsequent c i v i l t o r t 
t r i a l , under the provisions of Section 78-24-8 Utah Code Ann., 
1953? 
5 . I s an i n t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a l l e g e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r 
m i s c o n d u c t , i t s f i n d i n g s and any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s a n c t i o n s imposed 
on a p o l i c e o f f i c e r e x c l u d a b l e e v i d e n c e from a c i v i l t o r t t r i a l 
a s " S u b s e q u e n t Remedial Measures" under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 
4 07 of t h e Utah R u l e s of E v i d e n c e ? 
I I 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
P l a i n t i f f - M e y e r s sued S a l t Lake C i t y , under t h e d o c t r i n e o f 
r e s p o n d e a t s u p e r i o r f o r t h e a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n t o r w i l l f u l and 
i n t e n t i o n a l m i s c o n d u c t of a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , who p u r p o r t e d l y s h u t 
p l a i n t i f f ' s l eg in a c a r d o o r when t h i s c i t i z e n a t t e m p t e d t o e x i t 
h i s v e h i c l e a f t e r d i s o b e y i n g p o l i c e t r a f f i c c o n t r o l i n s t r u c -
t i o n s . During t r i a l , t h e i s s u e a r o s e a s t o whe the r o r no t t o 
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a d m i t a l e t t e r from t h e P o l i c e Depa r tmen t t o t h e P l a i n t i f f , which 
informed t h e P l a i n t i f f - M e y e r s of t h e r e s u l t s of h i s c o m p l a i n t . 
I l l 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The i n t e n t i o n a l and w i l l f u l m i s c o n d u c t a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e 
c c m p l a i n t were d i s m i s s e d , upon s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , and 
t h e c a s e p roceeded t o t r i a l upon t h e n e g l i g e n c e c a u s e of 
a c t i o n . C o n t r a r y t o S a l t Lake C i t y ' s Motion in L i m i n i and o v e r 
t r i a l o b j e c t i o n , t h e l o w e r c o u r t a d m i t t e d , i n e v i d e n c e , a l e t t e r 
from t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t , a d v i s i n g P l a i n t i f f - M e y e r s , i n g e n e r a l 
t e r m s , of t h e r e s u l t s of an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s p o l i c e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; t h e C o u r t r u l e d t h e l e t t e r c o n s t i t u t e d an 
" a d m i s s i o n a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t . " A s u b s e q u e n t mot ion by t h e C i t y 
f o r a new t r i a l , ba sed on t h e e r r o r of a d m i t t i n g t h e s u b j e c t 
l e t t e r , was d e n i e d . 
IV 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
The j u r y found S a l t Lake C i t y l i a b l e and awarded damages 
t o t a l l i n g $ 2 6 , 9 6 2 . 8 4 . The C o u r t e n t e r e d Judgment a g a i n s t S a l t 
Lake C i t y for t h e sum of $ 2 2 , 6 7 6 . 5 5 . 
V 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The f a c t s , when viewed in a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e j u r y 
v e r d i c t , d e m o n s t r a t e t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
1. During t h e f l o o d s of 1983 , wa t e r was d i v e r t e d down S t a t e 
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St ree t in Sal t Lake Ci ty , necess i ta t ing a rerouting of t r a f f i c . 
(R-2) 
2. Officer James R. Nelson was stat ioned at 600 South and 
Main S t r ee t , in his o f f i c i a l capacity as a sworn City police 
o f f i ce r , to d i r ec t tha t t r a f f i c . (R-2,3) 
3. Plaintiff-Meyers was driving southbound on Main,Street 
looking to make a l e f t turn to proceed eas t . (R-2). 
4. An argument developed between Plaintiff-Meyers and 
Officer Nelson as to whether or not Plaintiff-Meyers was allowed 
to turn l e f t . (R-3) Officer Nelson struck Plaintiff-Meyers1 
vehic le to s top. Plaintiff-Meyers stopped, opened h is car door 
and attempted to exi t the vehic le . Nelson attempted to keep Mr. 
Meyers in the car by forcing the door shut and Plaintiff-Meyers1 
foot was caught between the door and the ca r . Plaintiff-Meyers 
claimed injury from the door being closed on his ankle. (R-246; 
R-239,240) 
5. Plaintiff-Meyers complained to Sal t Lake City Police 
In terna l Affairs Department concerning the conduct of Officer 
Nelson. Under Civil Service Rules and State law, the pol ice 
chief has the duty to supervise t h i s para-mi l i ta ry force and may 
administer d i s c i p l i n e for up to 15 days, without appeal r i gh t s of 
the of f icer ; more severe sanctions permit an appeal to a c i t i zen 
member Civil Service Commission. Section 10-3-909-912; 10-3-
1001-13 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. Thus, pursuant to 
departmental p rac t i ce , an department inves t iga t ion was conducted 
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to determine if some pol ice administrat ive action was in order 
against Officer Nelson. (R-182) 
6. During a pol ice department in ternal inves t iga t ion , the 
off icer i s required, on pain of dismissal , to give a statement. 
(R-89) No Miranda warning is usually given and the inquiry i s 
directed a t determining if the off icer violated department r u l e s , 
procedure or Civil Service Rules and Regulations, including such 
e t h i c a l and public policy matters as act ina in a manner to "bring 
d i s c r e d i t on the department." Sal t Lake Civil Service Rule 2 .2-
6(e ) , Appendix C; (R-88, 89) 
7. The Internal Affairs Division of the City pol ice 
department conducted an inves t iga t ion of Plaintiff-Meyers1 
complaint. I t found the act ions of Officer Nelson inappropriate 
for a City off icer and not i f ied the Chief of Police, who imposed 
adminis t ra t ive sanctions on the o f f i ce r , which included a one day 
suspension. (R-184) All of these events occurred pr ior to the 
f i l ing of any c i v i l s u i t by Plaint iff-Meyers. (R-3) 
8. Plaintiff-Meyers was not i f ied of the d isposi t ion of the 
In te rna l Affairs complaint by l e t t e r from Lt. Duncan of the 
In terna l Affairs Division. The l e t t e r s tated the complaint was 
"sus ta ined" . "Sustained" was defined in the l e t t e r as a rul ing 
t h a t : "the event did occur and the off icer i s gu i l ty of the 
complaint alleged or other inf rac t ion ." (R-183, emphasis added; 
at tached as Appendix "A") 
9. Plaintiff-Meyers subsequently f i led c iv i l s u i t , a l leging 
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negl igent and wil lful misconduct on the par t of Officer Nelson. 
(R-2, 3) He, fu r the r , asser ted the City was vicar iously l i a b l e 
under the doct r ine of respondeat super ior . (R-2, 3) To prove 
the alleged negligence, Plaintif-Meyers sought to introduce the 
pol ice department 's Internal Affairs inves t iga t ion and l e t t e r to 
him, advising tha t his complaint to the police had been 
invest igated and tha t Officer Nelson had been found to have acted 
inappropr ia te ly . (R-183, 275) Defendant-Salt Lake City objected 
vigorously to the discovery of in ternal a f fa i r s inves t iga t ion 
matters and made a Motion in Limini to exclude from evidence a l l 
mater ia l s pertaining to the Internal Affairs inves t iga t ion , 
including the subject l e t t e r . (R-227-228, 276-280) 
10. The lower court took the Motion in Limini under 
advisement, with the indicat ion tha t such evidence would not be 
admitted . (R-2 82) 
11. However, a t t r i a l , j u s t before close of P la in t i f f -
Meyer's case , Judge Rigtrup reversed his previous d i rec t ion and 
admitted the Internal Affairs l e t t e r from Lt. Duncan. The stated 
grounds for admission of the l e t t e r was tha t the l e t t e r was an 
"admission against i n t e r e s t . " (R-284). Not discussed by the 
Court were the Ci ty ' s evidentiary object ions , other than the 
hearsay r u l e . A subsequent motion for a new t r i a l was briefed 
and argued before Judge Rigtrup, based again on the er ror of 
admitting the l e t t e r . The motion was denied. (R-253) 
12. The jury returned a verdic t against Salt Lake City for 
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the ac t s of Officer Nelson and assessed damages in the sum of 
$26,962.84. 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Rule 407 appl icable . Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence c lear ly provides tha t evidence of subsequent measures 
taken to avoid future harm or to make a similar event l e s s l i ke ly 
to occur i s not admissible to prove negligence in a c i v i l s u i t . 
Public policy demands tha t people take steps in the furtherance 
of safety and j u d i c i a l l y t r ea t ing correct ive acts as admissions 
of l i a b i l i t y would c h i l l tha t sound pol icy. 
Invest igat ions of pol ice misconduct, d i s c ip l i ne or 
r e t r a in ing are subsequent measures protected by t h i s public 
po l icy . Among o thers , the reasons for disallowing the r e s u l t s of 
an in te rna l invest igat ion and r e s u l t s of sanctions imposed 
against a pol ice of f icer for misconduct are the following: 
(1) The City and the police administration would be 
d i scour aged- f ran making a t imely, independent and ccmpr ehensive 
evaluation of a c i t i z e n ' s charge of police misconduct, if any 
subsequent d i s c i p l i n e or finding would cons t i tu te an admission of 
c i v i l l i a b i l i t y ; 
(2) There would be a motivation to "whitewash" or make the 
findings ju s t i fy otherwise improper conduct in order to build a 
record of n o n - l i a b i l i t y in subsequent c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n ; 
(3) Allowing these matters in evidence would be a 
- 7 -
motivation to delay any inves t iga t ion past appl icable s t a t u t e s of 
l imi ta t ion or past the conclusion of c i v i l cases and, thus , delay 
r e t r a i n i n g , termination of a bad off icer or other appropriate 
cor rec t ive sanctions against er rant police o f f i ce r s ; and 
(4) Confidence and respect for c i v i l i a n control of the 
para-mi l i ta ry police forces of the City would be undermined i f 
de lay , whitewash or secrecy of r e s u l t s were maintained, 
A complaining c i t i zen has a r igh t to expect and to receive 
knowledge tha t his complaint was timely addressed and to be 
advised, a t l e a s t general ly , of the r e s u l t s of tha t 
inves t iga t ion . 
Thus, the underlying philosophy and express provisions of 
excluding subsequent remedial a c t i v i t i e s found in Rule 407 are 
appl icable to police in terna l a f fa i r s inves t iga t ions and any 
sanctions or notice of t ha t inves t iga t ion . The lower court erred 
and must be reversed as a statement of public pol icy . 
2. The subject l e t t e r was not competent, re levant or 
material . ^J\ l e t t e r wri t ten to a c i t i zen advising him tha t h is 
complaint of police off icer misconduct had been received, the 
issues investigated and that the Officer was " . . . gu i l t y of the 
complaint alleged or other infract ion" was not competent, 
re levant or material to the t o r t issues of negligence. 
The issues of negligence are whether or not a defendant 
breached the "duty of due care" owed by a "reasonable man" to a 
defendant under the circumstances, and whether or not the breach 
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of duty caused injury. Contrarywise, an in ternal a f fa i r s 
inves t iga t ion i s concerned with whether or not the police 
adminis t ra t ive ru l e s or po l i c ies were v io l a t ed . Included in such 
a review i s the non-tor t concept of whether the police off icer 
acted in a manner to "bring d i sc red i t to the department." 
Because the elements of determining whether or not an 
of f ice r violated the ru l e s and regulat ions of the department are 
t o t a l l y d iss imi lar to the elements of t o r t , the finding of a 
v io l a t i on of pol ice ru l e s i s not an admission of t o r t 
negligence. The lower court erred in admitting the l e t t e r as an 
"admission against i n t e r e s t s " when the l e t t e r merely advised the 
complaining c i t i z en tha t h is complaint had been sustained and 
tha t the of f icer had violated the ru l e s of the department. 
The pre judic ia l effect of the admission and the abuse of 
d i s c r e t i on of the lower court i s apparent from the ve rd i c t . The 
undisputed evidence demonstrated tha t the c i t i z en had refused to 
follow the lawful orders of a pol ice of f ice r in d i rec t ing t r a f f i c 
during a flood emergency and then attempted to exi t his vehicle 
in a threatening s i t u a t i o n . The off icer was attempting to keep 
Mr. Meyer in the car and the undisputed testimony demonstrated 
t h a t the alleged injury to h is ankle could not have occurred in a 
pincer movement; i t would have had to have occurred in a twist ing 
motion. Plaintiff-Meyers admitted he sustained a twisting injury 
to the same ankle in elk and deer hunting inc iden ts , following 
the confrontation with Officer Nelson. 
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The admission of the subject letter was prejudicial and was 
tantamount to an improper directed verdict on the issues of 
liability. Thus the lower court should be reversed on the basis 
that the letter and the results of the investigation were 
irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent on the tort issues before 
the jury. 
3. Any relevance and materiality of the letter was totally 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect. In the context of this 
litigation, the judge had indicated in response to the City's 
Motion in Limini that the letter was inappropriate and would not 
be admitted. Near the conclusion of the trial, the Court 
reversed this preliminary indication and gave the letter to the 
jury as an "admission against interest." 
The letter discusses the Officer being "guilty" of the 
matters alleged by the complainant or "other applicable 
regulations." Any marginal relevance, materiality or competence 
of the letter on the issue of negligence are off-set by the 
substantial prejudice apparent from the wording of the letter, 
against the employing entity of the police officer, Salt Lake 
City Corporation. 
The letter was written in fulfillment of public policy 
dictating a fair and prompt review of a citizen complaint 
charging police misconduct. The letter was written in 
furtherance of the public right to be informed of the results of 
such an investigation. The prejudicial aspect of the letter in 
-10-
t h i s c o n t e x t s h o u l d have been r e c o g n i z e d by t h e lower c o u r t and 
e x c l u d e d f ron e v i d e n c e t o p r o t e c t t h e C i t y a g a i n s t p r e j u d i c e and 
p r e s e r v e t h e s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s i t was s e e k i n g t o a d v a n c e . 
VII 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The C i t y s e e k s a r u l i n g t h a t p o l i c e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and r e p o r t s t h e r e o f t o c o m p l a i n i n g c i t i z e n s a r e 
n o t a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e in s u b s e q u e n t c i v i l t r i a l s a g a i n s t t h e 
C i t y o r i t s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . The v e r d i c t s h o u l d be v a c a t e d w i t h 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e l o w e r c o u r t t o e x c l u d e t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s 
l e t t e r from e v i d e n c e in any f u t u r e p r o c e e d i n g . 
V I I I 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LETTER IS INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE BECAUSE 
SUBSEQUENT MEASURES TAKEN TO PROTECT PUBLIC 
SAFETY MAY NOT BE USED TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE. 
R u l e of E v i d e n c e 407 s t a t e s , 
"When a f t e r an e v e n t , measu re s a r e t a k e n wh ich , i f 
t a k e n p r e v i o u s l y , would have made t h e e v e n t l e s s 
l i k e l y t o o c c u r , e v i d e n c e of t h e s u b s e q u e n t m e a s u r e s 
i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e t o p rove n e g l i g e n c e o r c u l p a b l e 
c o n d u c t in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e e v e n t . " 
N e a r l y a c e n t u r y ago , t h e Uni ted S t a t e s Supreme Cour t e x p l a i n e d 
t h e r e a s o n i n g t h a t e v e n t u a l l y formed t h e b a s i s f o r t h i s r u l e : 
" . . . T h e e v i d e n c e i s i n c o m p e t e n t b e c a u s e t h e t a k i n g of 
such p r e c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e f u t u r e i s n o t t o be 
c o n s t r u e d a s an a d m i s s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e 
p a s t , h a s no l e g i t i m a t e t e n d e n c y t o p rove t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t had been n e g l i g e n t b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t 
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happened, and i s calculated to d i s t r a c t the minds of 
the jury from the real i ssue, and to create a 
prejudice against the defendant." Columbia and Pugent 
Sound Ry. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207, 36 
L.Ed.405, 12 S.Ct. 591, 593 (1892) (Emphasis added). 
The d ra f t e r s of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
was adopted verbatim by Utah, r e i t e r a t e d t h i s reasoning in 
support of the modern r u l e ; 
"The ru le r e s t s on two grounds, (1) the conduct i s not 
in fact an admission, since the conduct i s egually 
cons i s ten t with injury by mere accident or through 
contr ibutory negligence . . . (2) the o ther , and more 
impressive, ground for exclusion r e s t s on a social 
policy of encouraging people to take, or at l e a s t not 
discouraging them frcm taking, s teps in furtherance of 
added safe ty ." (Emphasis added) Advisory Committee 
Notes to Rules of Evidence 40 7. 
Most modern wri ters and courts acknowledge the social policy 
r a t i ona l e as the basis for Rule 40 7. See, 29 Am Jur 2d 
"Evidence" §275 p . 323; 64 ALR 2d "Annotation Evidence— 
Precautions After Accident" 1296 §3(B); Wright and Graham, 
Federal Prac t ice and Procedure, Vol. 23 §. 5282, p . 88. 
The d ra f t e r s of Rule 407 spec i f i ca l ly note t h a t : 
"cour ts have applied t h i s p r inc ip le to exclude 
evidence of . . . discharge of employees, and the 
language of the present ru l e i s broad enough to 
encompass t h i s i s sue . " See, Advisory Committee 
Notes to Evidentiary Rule 407 (emphasis added). 
In a case v i r t u a l l y iden t ica l to the case a t bar the 
California Supreme Court held d i sc ip l ina ry action following an 
incident was inadmissable. Here, the c i t y of Los Angeles was the 
defendant in a personal injury ac t ion , a r i s ing out of an alleged 
assau l t made on a c i t i z e n by a c i t y pol ice o f f i ce r . The 
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complainant c i t i z en served an interrogatory on the c i t y , 
request ing any information concerning suspensions of the police 
o f f i c e r . The t r i a l and appel la te courts both ruled such 
information was discoverable; however, the appel la te court noted 
t h a t : 
"Any suspension resul t ing from the incident [in 
question] would not be discoverable in view of the 
s e t t l ed rule prohibi t ing the use of remedial 
measures undertaken af te r an event to prove 
negligence or cu lpab i l i ty in connection with the 
event i t s e l f . " City of L.A. v . Superior Court of 
City of L.A. , 109 Cal . Rptr. 365, 368 (1973) 
(Emphasis added). 
Similar to the California case fac ts and the Advisory 
Committee observat ions, the case a t bar presents a case where, 
following a pol ice o f f i c e r / c i t i z e n confrontat ion, an internal 
police department administrat ive review was undertaken. The 
o f f i ce r was determined to have violated department ru les and was 
suspended one day's pay. Also, the complaining c i t i zen was 
gener ica l ly informed tha t h i s a l l ega t ions had been investigated 
and tha t the police department had found the off icer had violated 
department ru le s of conduct towards c i t i z e n s . Such an 
inves t iga t ion and i t s r e s u l t s and sanctions against the off icer 
a re "measures" taken following an "event" which are those which 
would have made the "event l ess l ike ly to occur" within the 
meaning of Rule 407. The l e t t e r , thus , should not have been 
R-184. 
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admitted in evidence before the jury . 
The act of promptly invest igat ing complaints and timely 
informing a complaining c i t i zen of the r e s u l t s of tha t 
inves t iga t ion promotes the s p i r i t of Rule 40 7. I t promotes 
public confidence tha t wrongdoing i s appropriately punished, tha t 
government i s responsive to t h e i r charges of o f f i c i a l misconduct 
and t h e i r pol ice can be adminis t rat ively con t ro l l ed . More 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t encourages police self-management and 
discourages conspiracies of s i lence to avoid c i v i l l i a b i l i t y . 
Overall public safety from vigorous in te rna l inves t iga t ion i s 
enhanced, as per the Rule's philosophy. 
The policy reasons mi l i t a t ing tha t Utah follow the in tent of 
the d ra f t e r s of Rule 407 and the California holding a re , thus , 
commanding. Obviously, if an inves t iga t ion wil l be evidence of 
c i v i l l i a b i l i t y , a pol ice administrat ion wi l l be motivated t o : 
(a) "white-wash" an incident ; (b) f a i l to notify in teres ted or 
complaining p a r t i e s tha t appropriate act ion was taken on a 
complaint of police misconduct; or (c) delay inves t igat ions past 
appl icable s t a t u t e s of l imi ta t ions or past the conclusion of 
c i v i l cases . These are the precise types of concerns the common-
law and s ta tu tory exclusions were intended to prevent. 
This conclusion of non-admissibi l i ty , a l so , finds support in 
the re la ted issue of the pr iv i lege against evident iary discovery 
of in te rna l a f fa i r s invest igatory matters in a c i v i l t o r t 
proceeding. These internal a f fa i r s inves t iga t ions are protected 
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under Utah law, which provides: 
"There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to 
preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot 
be examined as a witness in the following cases: 
• • • 
" (5) A public of f icer cannot be examined as to 
ccmmun ica t ions made to him in o f f i c i a l confidence 
when the public i n t e r e s t s would suffer by the 
d i sc losure . " 78-24-8(5) Utah Code Ann.
 y 1953 as 
amended (Emphasis added). 
This general statement of executive p r iv i l ege has been recognized 
by the Tenth Circui t Court of Appeals in the context of police 
in te rna l a f fa i r s i nves t iga t ions . Denver Policemen's Protect ive 
Ass'n v. Lichtenste in , 660 F.2d 432 (1981). Regarding t h i s 
i s sue , the Tenth Circui t ru led , 
"The executive p r iv i lege allows governmental 
department heads to prevent d i sc losure of documents 
within t h e i r con t ro l , i f nondisclosure would serve 
the public i n t e r e s t . Id. 660 F.2d at 437 (Emphasis 
added). 
The Lichenstein court applied a "balancing tes t " to the criminal 
defendant 's attempt to discover the in te rna l invest igat ion f i l e s 
which he believed contained exculpatory mater ial necessary to his 
e f fec t ive defense. The Court remanded to allow only an in camera 
review by the t r i a l court to see if any such material exis ted . 
However, the court c l ea r ly recognized the important individual 
r i g h t s of privacy tha t may be invaded by discovery and 
s ign i f i can t soc ie ta l i n t e r e s t s a t i s sue . I t c i ted with approval 
a Colorado Sta te Court decision approving a recognit ion of these 
i n t e r e s t s , s t a t i n g : 
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"
 f
 . . . a court should consider and weigh whether 
disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest,. ' " Id. at p. 438, guoting Martinelli v. 
Dist. Ct. in and for County of Denver, 612 P.2d 
1083, 1093 (Colo. 1980) (Emphasis added). 
An often cited federal court suggests a 10 part analysis is 
applicable, before civil discovery is permitted of any police 
investigatory f i le . Those criteria are: 
"(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart 
governmental processes by discouraging citizens 
from giving the government information; (2) the 
impact upon persons who have given information of 
having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree 
to which governmental self-evaluation and 
consequent program improvement will be chilled by 
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is 
factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the 
party seeking the discovery is an actual or 
potential defendant in any criminal proceeding 
either pending or reasonably likely to follow from 
the incident in question; (6) whether the police 
investigation has been completed; (7) whether any 
intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have 
arisen or may arise from the investigation; (8) 
whether the plaintiff 's suit is nonfrivolous and 
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information 
sought is available through other discovery or from 
other sources; and (10) the importance of the 
information sought to the plaintiff 's case." 
Frankenhouser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D.Pa. 
1973) (Emphasis added). 
Certainly, if the just discovery of police investigatory 
files are recognized to be done only on a "balancing test", 
evidence of the results of that investigation should not be given 
a jury, without, at least, an equally thoughtful review of the 
societal interests involved. More correctly, if courts are 
compelled to evaluate the effect simple factual discovery would 
have as a "chilling effect of police self-improvement programs" 
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or to consider if "d isc ip l inary proceedings" have a r i sen , "a 
court should more than jus t balance" the impact of admitting in 
evidence a l e t t e r announcing the conclusions of such an 
inves t iga t ion . I t should not admit the opinions, conclusion or 
evidence of d i s c ip l i ne in evidence, without a compelling 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
However, in the case a t bar , Judge Rigtrup of the lower 
court applied no "balancing t e s t " , pr ior to admitting the l e t t e r 
into evidence and did not consider the public policy issues which 
common-law and Rule of Evidence 407 are designed to advance. 
In sum, non-disclosure and non-admissibi l i ty of the l e t t e r 
g rea t ly serves the public i n t e r e s t s . By maintaining the 
conf iden t ia l i ty of in te rna l a f f a i r s inves t iga t ions and the non-
admiss ib i l i ty of announced r e s u l t s , three v i t a l public i n t e r e s t s 
are served and advanced: 
(1) Prompt and f a i r inves t iga t ions of every c i t i zen 
complaint i s encouraged. Obviously, if d i sc ip l ina ry action 
against pol ice off icers or conclusions of wrong-doing are 
"admissions" of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y , there i s j ud i c i a l l y t reated 
s ign i f i can t de ter rent against pol ice departments making fa i r 
inves t iga t ion or disclosing the r e s u l t s thereof. This axiom i s 
even more apparent than allowing factual discovery of evidence 
developed in an in te rna l inves t iga t ion , which on occasion may be 
j u s t i f i e d as the only source of witness names or other data . 
(2) Timely administrat ive sanctions against er rant police 
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officers and/or retraining of them should be encouraged, to 
protect others in society from similar problems. 
(3) Notice of the results of the investigation to 
complaining citizens is essential and their rightful 
expectation* The public perception, knowledge and reality that 
grievances will be timely reviewed is a "must",2 i f p u b l i c 
c o n f i d e n c e i n p o l i c e i s t o b e m a i n t a i n e d . 
A l l o f t h e s e i m p o r t a n t i n t e r e s t s a r e d e f e a t e d by J u d g e 
R i g t r u p ' s a d v e r s e r u l i n g . I t m u s t b e r e v e r s e d t o e n c o u r a g e 
U t a h ' s l a r g e s t u r b a n p o l i c e f o r c e t o p r o p e r l y manage i t s a rmed 
p a r a - m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n and t o m a i n t a i n p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e i n 
t h a t c o n t r o l . Common- law, e x e c u t i v e p r i v i l e g e a n d R u l e o f 
E v i d e n c e 4 0 7 , w h i c h r e q u i r e s e x c l u d i n g s u b s e q u e n t r e m e d i a l 
m e a s u r e s f rom e v i d e n c e , b a r t h e l e t t e r ' s a d m i s s i b i l i t y . 
POINT I I 
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S LETTER TO A 
COMPLAINING CITIZEN WAS AN INFORMATIONAL 
STATEMENT CONCERNING POLICE ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICY; AS SUCH, IT WAS IRRELEVANT, IMMATERIAL 
AND- INCOMPETENT ON THE ISSUES IN CIVIL TORT 
LITIGATION. 
The t r i a l c o u r t a l l o w e d a l e t t e r from p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t ' s 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f f i c e , a d v i s i n g a c i t i z e n of t h e p o l i c e 
d e p a r t m e n t ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n o n t h i s c o m p l a i n t . The 
2 S e e C h i e f W i l l o u g h b y ' s A f f i d a v i t f i l e d i n s u p p o r t o f t h e M o t i o n 
i n L i m i n i s e e k i n g t o e x c l u d e t h e l e t t e r a n n o u n c i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f 
t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . R - 1 1 7 - 1 2 3 ; A p p e n d i x " B " . 
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lower court's rationale for admission of this letter in a tort 
suit against the disciplined officer was that it was an 
"admission against interest." (R-183, 279) However, an 
admission or statement "against interest" is an exception to the 
evidentiary rule barring the admission of hearsay, when the 
declarant is unavailable. Rule of Evidence 804(B)(3). It does 
not on admissibility solve against every other evidentiary 
objection. 
More importantly, the trial court made no determination as 
to the availability or the declarant of the letter. Thus, the 
trial court erred in admitting the letter under the hearsay 
exception. 
Further, even if the hearsay exception was proper, the lower 
court overlooked the fact that just because a statement is not 
hearsay, that fact alone does not qualify it as admissible 
evidence. A fundamental rule of admissibility is "relevance", 
"materiality" and "ccmpetence." 
"Relevance" is defined as matters 
" . . . having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Utah Rule of 
Evidence 4 01. 
The issue in the case below was whether or not Officer Nelson 
acted negligently; that is, breached a duty of due care owed by a 
reasonably prudent man under the circumstances which caused 
another injury. The conclusion by the Internal Affairs Division 
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of the police department did not concern these issues of 
negligence; rather, the police department was concerned with the 
question of whether Officer Nelson violated departmental 
guidelines justifying personnel sanctions or retraining. (Fact 
No. 5, 6); Affidavit of Chief Willoughby, Appendix "B", R-88. 
Those administrative issues have no necessary connection in 
deteinnining civil tort negligence and, in fact, involve wholly 
different factual and legal predicates. The police chief may, 
for example, discipline a police officer for violations of police 
rules and procedures that may or may not constitute a tort, but 
deal exclusively with Civil Service Rules or administrative 
procedural orders calculated to manage a para-military force. 
Alternatively, they may deal with management decisions designed 
to preserve the public confidence in its police force and avoid 
the appearance of impropriety, such as the rule requiring the 
police to act so as "not to bring discredit on the department." 
(Fact Nos. 5, 6) 
In his affidavit, Chief E. L. Bud Willoughby explained under 
oath to the lower court in a pre-trial motion that the function 
of the Internal Affairs Division and the police disciplinary 
process. Internal affairs' main function is to conduct formal 
internal investigations concerning possible instances of 
misconduct by police departmental personnel. These 
investigations "may" be initiated either by a senior member of 
the department or automatically instituted upon the filing of a 
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complaint alleging police misconduct by a citizen. (R-88) If an 
investigation reveals the existence of misconduct, the police 
personnel involved are appropriately disciplined and/or 
retrained. (R-88) 
State statutes recognized the unique need to manage this 
force and vest in the police chief power to discipline "when in 
his judgment the good of the service demands it." 10-3-912, Utah 
Code Ann., 1953, as amended. The discretion given the chief to 
act "as the good of the service demands it" supercedes even the 
elected Mayor, who may discharge the chief but not directly 
supervise the individual officer. See 10-3-1219 and 10-3-911(4), 
912; cf. 10-3-1012 Utah Code Ann., 1953. This legislative 
recognition of the unique status of sworn, gun-carrying peace 
officers and the discretion given the chief to discpline an 
officer (if he breaches administrative rules or acts to bring 
discredit to the department) is clearly not a "negligence" 
standard. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts §286 (1965) provides an 
outline illustrating the error of the lower court in ruling 
otherwise; it summarizes the law regarding when rules and 
ordinances may be used as establishing a duty of due care, as 
follows: 
"The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of 
a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative 
enactment or an administrative regulation whose 
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part 
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"(a) to protect a class of persons which includes 
the one whose interest is invaded, and 
"(b) to protect the particular interest which is 
invaded, and 
"(c) to protect that interest against the kind of 
harm which has resulted, and 
"(d) to protect that interest against the 
particular hazard from which the harm results." 
See also: Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 
P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980); Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Rolofff 630 P.2d 840 (Ore. 1981); Iverson v. 
Solsbery, 641 P.2d 314 (Col. 1982); Stafford v. 
United Farm Workers of America, 656 P.2d 564 (Ca., 
1983); Sagebrush, Ltd. v. Carson City, (Nev. 1983). 
In other words, the duty or standard of conduct articulated by a 
statute or administrative regulation may establish the 
"reasonable person" standard of "due care" in tort negligence, 
only after a finding that the purpose of the statute or 
regulation includes all of the four above listed elements. 
The Alaska Supreme Court elaborated further on this rule. 
The Court held, 
"Substitution of a statute or regulation is only 
appropriate where the statute or regulation 
prescribes specific conduct. Substitution is not 
appropriate where the statute or regulation sets 
out a general or abstract standard of care." 
Bailey v. Lenord, 625 P.2d 849, 856 (1981) 
(Emphasis added). 
In looking at the standards of conduct for the police 
department (as established by statute and regulation) no specific 
conduct is prescribed. It is patently obvious that the police 
regulations under which Officer Nelson was being judged in the 
Internal Affairs Investigation were not those which created a 
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tort "duty of due care." Such disciplinary standards as: 
"Conduct which may tend to bring discredit on the department", or 
"when . . . the good of the service demands it" are not designed 
to protect a specific class of persons which includes Plaintiff-
Meyers. Further, they are not designed to protect Mr. Meyers1 
allegedly invaded interests of assault and battery or personal 
injury. 
Rather, it is clear from the wording that these statutes and 
regulations were more designed to protect the interests of the 
police department, public confidence, assure police discipline 
and assure civil control of a para-military force. 
In the instant case, respondent Lee Meyers filed a complaint 
with the police department alleging misconduct during the 
encounter on the part of Officer Nelson. (R-2, 3) Pursuant to 
City Police Department policy, an investigation was initiated by 
Lieutenant William Duncan, acting ccmmander of the Internal 
Affairs Unit. (R-83-85) Following such an investigation, any of 
four determinations may be made: (1) unfounded, (2) exonerated, 
(3) not sustained, or (4) sustained. Mr. Meyer's allegation was 
determined to be "sustained". (R-183) 
In a letter to Mr. Meyers from the police department, he was 
informed of that determination. The letter went on to explain 
that "sustained" means the event did occur and the officer is 
guilty of the complaint alleged or other infraction1" (emphasis 
added). (R-183). Facially patent it was not an admission of 
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violating the element of tort law. 
In sharp contrast to these personnel and police administra-
tive determinations, the trial jury's duty was to determine 
whether or not Officer Nelson was "negligent" in his conduct 
towards Mr. Meyers. The standard negligence is that: 
"The failure to do what a reasonably prudent person 
would have done under the circumstances of the 
situation, or doing what such person under such 
existing circumstances would not have done. The 
essence of the fault may lie in actina or omitting to 
act. The jury is dictated and measured by the exigen-
cies of the occasion." (See Instruction No. 12, 
R-2 02) 
The issue for the jury is what "a reasonable person" would do 
under the circumstances and a violation of that standard, not 
what Chief Willoughby or Lt. Duncan may think administratively 
appropriate for a Salt Lake City Police Officer under the chief's 
duty to manage the police force and instill public confidence in 
it. 
The lower c o u r t ' s equating t h i s administrat ive finding with 
t ha t of t o r t was pa tent ly improper and revers ib le e r ro r . This 
e r r o r was magnified by the circumstance of the Court 's admittance 
over vigorous object ion. The jury was l ike ly influenced by "an 
admission against in t e res t " af ter objection was made by the 
City. The admission had the appearance of giving the Judge's 
blessing to the conclusion tha t the City had, in ef fec t , 
confessed negligence following i t s own inves t iga t ion . 
In sum, t o r t negligence theory i s based on a reasonable 
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prudent person standard. For training and discipline, police 
officers are held to a much different, stricter standard than 
that of a "reasonably prudent person." A breach of police 
department regulations does not, as a matter of law or by 
reasonable inference, show a breach of civil law. Such demands 
of professionalism which prescribed conduct "unbecoming a police 
officer" or that "bringing discredit to the department" ,are not 
the elements of "negligence" in a civil tort action. Rather, 
they are higher and different standard imposed for entirely 
different objectives. 
Thus, the letter "sustaining" a charge that Officer Nelson 
had violated some department regulation or policy was not 
material, relevant or competent evidence as to the breach of a 
tort duty of due care. The lower court, through Judge Rigtrup, 
prejudicially erred in its admission of this letter and should be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF RELEVANT, THE LETTER IS INADMISSIBLE, ITS 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT FAR OUTWEIGHS ITS PROBATIVE 
VALUE. 
Even accepting arguendo that the letter was relevant, 
material or competent evidence, it should still have been 
excluded under Rule of Evidence 403, which states: 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury ..." (emphasis added) 
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The letter at issue concerned a police administrative decision on 
how Officer Nelson handled the situation. The jury was never 
instructed that the determination made in the latter was not 
based upon negligence. Further, they were not instructed that 
the police department based its determination on an entirely 
different factual and legal standard than that which concerned 
the tort case. 
The letter itself was unclear as to what conduct had been 
evaluated; it left open to conjecture and speculation which 
portions, if any, of the respondent's civil case had been 
evaluated. Allowing the letter into evidence by surprise and at 
the last minute not only confused the issue as to what 
constitutes negligence, but it also left open for speculation 
what the police department actually concluded. 
Concerning the danger of unfair prejudice, this Court has 
provided a definition; it observed: 
"Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency 
to ... [cause] a jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propositions of 
the case." Terry v. Zions Co-Op Merchantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 323 (1979). 
By admitting the letter, the jury was left with the impression 
that the City admitted or confessed (considering the use of the 
term "guilty" in the letter) negligence and liability. The jury 
obviously gave great credence to the letter, as evidenced by 
their finding of 99% negligence on Officer Nelson's part and 1% 
on Mr. Meyers' part, on evidence which showed among other things: 
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1. The Plaintiff's ankle injury could not have been 
sustained by the compression of a door on the ankle; rather, 
Plaintiff Meyers' own physician testified it must have been the 
result of a twisting action. No twisting ocurred at the scene. 
(R-303) Additionally, the medical records show Plaintiff-Meyers 
severely twisted his ankle while elk hunting. Later, on a deer 
hunt he also, apparently, injured his ankle requiring medical 
attention. (PI. Ex. 1, R-188) 
2. The whole incident was caused by Plaintiff-Meyers 
refusing to obey the lawful direction of a Police Officer, 
controlling traffic, during a public flooding emergency and, 
then, attempted to exit his car, leaving it blocking the 
intersection during a time of massive traffic disruption. (R-
330, 341) 
Any probative value of administrative investigation of the 
Police Officer was outweighed by its prejudicial effect of 
suggesting, improperly, that the City confessed tortious 
wrongdoing. The admission was tantamount to an improper judicial 
directed verdict as to liability against the City. As such, it 
should be reversed. 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court, through the Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
materially and prejudicially erred admitting in evidence a letter 
advising a complaining citizen of the results of an internal 
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inves t iga t ion concerning alleged Police Officer misconduct. 
Admission of the l e t t e r violated the fundamental evidentiary 
requirement tha t evidence be re levant , mater ia l and canpetent on 
the issues before the t r i a l . In t h i s case, the l e t t e r re f lec ted 
only conclusions re la ted to v io la t ion of Police administrat ive 
p o l i c i e s , rules and regu la t ions . Since the l e t t e r did not 
involve the elements of t o r t , i t was incompetent, immaterial and 
i r r e l e v a n t . 
More importantly, the l e t t e r a t issue in the case a t bar 
v iola ted the c lear public policy as announced in Rule of Evidence 
407 which makes inadmissible subsequent correc t ive ac t ion . I t i s 
in the C i ty ' s and soc ie ty ' s i n t e r e s t to encourage prompt, f a i r 
and timely inves t iga t ions of alleged pol ice misconduct. I t i s , 
fu r the r , important tha t wrongdoing police off icers be d isc ip l ined 
or appropria te ly r e t r a ined . In addi t ion , a c i t i zen has a r igh t 
to be made aware of tha t the complaint has been reviewed and of 
the pol ice department 's f indings. This two-way ccmmunication i s 
e s s e n t i a l to "preserve public confidence in the management of t h i s 
para -mi l i t a ry force . 
Public pol icy , therefore , demands t ha t these inves t iga t ions 
and cor rec t ive act ions be encouraged and not be t rea ted as 
admission of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y . The lower c o u r t ' s contrary ruling 
encourages City and police o f f i c i a l s to act contrary to the 
public i n t e r e s t and should be reversed. 
Last ly , the highly pre judic ia l af fec t of admitting t h i s 
-2 8 -
letter, in the context of a civil trial against the employing 
City entity, were highly prejudicial* That prejudicial effect 
should have been recognized by the lower court? it abused its 
discretion by admitting the letter, over objection. 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court materially 
erred to the substantial prejudice of the public and the City. 
The verdict should be reversed and the case remanded, with 
instructions to the lower court to exclude the letter from 
evidence in any further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 1986 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
GREG R. HAWKINS 





_ « W AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION 
SALT UMi mj CORPORATION 
450 SOUTH T H I R D EAST 
TELEPHONE 535-7222 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34111 
July 1 , 1983 
E.L. "BUD" WILLOUGHBY 
CHIEF OF POLICE 
Lee R. Meyers 
385 East 575 North 
Layton, Utah 
84041 
Re: I.A. Case #83/032 
Dear Sir, 
On 5/31/83, you filed a complaint with our Internal 
Affairs Unit charging Officer James R. Nelson with excessive 
force. Your complaint was relative to an incident which 
occurred on 5/31/83, at 6th South and Main St. 
This letter is to inform you that the investigation is 
completed and the allegation contained in your complaint 
was determined to be "Sustained" by the Officer's division 
commander, Captain O.J. Peck. 
"Sustained" means: The event did occur and the officer 
is guilty of the complaint alleged or other infraction. 
We thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. 
If you have any questions concerning this investigation 
please contact Lt. W.C. Duncan, during normal working hours. 
Sincerely, 
E.L. "Bud" willoughby 




Internal Affairs Division 




GREG R. HAWKINS 
Assistant City Attorney 
Utah State Bar No. 1429 
Attorney for Defendant 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 535-7788 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LEE R. MEYERS, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
: E.L. BUD WILLOUGHBY 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. C-84-2838 
: (Judge Kenneth Rigtrup) 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
and JAMES R. NELSON, : 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
COMES NOW E. L. (BUD) WILLOUGHBY, who having been first duly 
sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1 . Affiant is the Chief of Police of the Salt Lake City 
Corporation. He has been employed in police work for more than 
29 years, becoming a major in the Kansas City Police Department, 
and as Chief of Police of the Pueblo, Colorado and Salt Lake City 
Police Departments. As Chief of Police, affiant directs the 
affairs and operations of the police department. As part of his 
duties, affiant has an internal affairs section to assist him. 
2. Affiant has had experience in working in internal 
a f f a i r s departments as well as d i r ec t i ng those departments and 
has personal knowledge of the mat ters se t forth herein . 
3 . The function of the I n t e r n a l Affairs Section i s to 
conduct formal internal inves t iga t ions concerning possible 
instances of misconduct by departmental personnel . These 
in t e rna l invest igat ions are i n i t i a t e d automatically upon the 
f i l i n g of a complaint by a c i t i z e n , which a l leges misconduct by a 
po l i ce o f f i ce r . Such inves t iga t ions may, a l so , be i n i t i a t ed by a 
senior member of the Police Department. All formal personnel 
inves t iga t ion reports are kept in the In te rna l Affairs Section, 
and the commanding officer of sa id sect ion i s the custodian 
thereof. 
4 . One main purpose of these in te rna l inves t iga t ions i s to 
enable the department to a sce r t a in the existence or non-existence 
of misconduct on the par t of po l i ce of f icers for possible 
d i sc ip l ina ry action or t r a i n i n g . Every ef for t i s made to gather 
as much information as possible per ta in ing to any instances of 
al leged misconduct by a police o f f i c e r . 
5. Any time an inves t iga t ion reveals the existence of 
su f f i c ien t misconduct, the offending personnel involved are 
appropria te ly d isc ip l ined . If d i s c ip l i na ry action is taken, the 
pol ice off icer involved has a r i g h t to a fu l l c i v i l service or 
o ther grievance hearing r e l a t ing to the propriety of the 
d i s c i p l i n e . One of the purposes of the in te rna l invest igat ion i s 
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to develop facts that will allow the City Attorney to present 
sufficient evidence to sustain any discipline imposed by me, if 
my decision is appealed to the civil service and the courts. 
6. To ensure and encourage full and complete disclosure of 
relevant information, personnel of the Police Department are 
assured that statements made by them to the investigating 
officers will be treated confidentially. When an officer is 
interviewed who may have been involved in improper conduct, he is 
generally not given a Constitutional Miranda type warning. 
7. Under the department's written policies, an officer must 
respond to questions asked of him in any internal investiga-
tion. If he refuses to cooperate in such an investigation, he 
will be disciplined. He is told that* he must tell the truth and 
that to conceal any information, no matter how incriminating of 
himself or his fellow officers, may result in disciplinary 
action, possibly including dismissal. Furthermore, the use of a 
lie detector test is employed in appropriate cases. 
8. A-police officer being interviewed as part of an 
internal investigation generally does not have an attorney 
present during the interview. Statements ohtained from 
departmental personnel are generally obtained without legal 
representation. 
9. When persons other than members of the department are 
interviewed in connection with such an investigation, they are 
commonly told that any information they give to the investigating 
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officers will be treated as being completely confidential. When 
citizens give statements (either as witnesses or as complain-
ants) , this assurance of confidentiality is often essential to 
obtain their cooperation. Sometimes citizens are apprehensive 
that the officers about whom a statement is made will be able to 
discover the contents of the statement or who made it. Further-
more, a citizen being interviewed by an investigator may make 
statements that not only implicate a police officer in improper 
conduct but also may implicate citizens in acts of an improper or 
criminal nature. Many of these citizens would be unwilling to 
give forthright information to investigative officers, if they 
were not convinced that the information given would be treated 
confidentially. 
10. It is affiant's experience that if citizens feel that 
they might be revealed as "informants'1 in their community, they 
would be reluctant to give any information to investigating 
officers. Many citizens, who in the past have cooperated with 
internal, ^ investigators, are genuinely fearful if their statements 
to or contact with Internal Investigation personnel are 
revealed. Any revelations would be a breach of the promises of 
confidentiality that were made to those citizens. 
11. The only departmental personnel outside of the Internal 
Investigation Section that have access to the files of the 
Internal Investigation Division, are personnel of the rank of 
Major or higher; i.e., high ranking administrative personnel 
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possessing a legitimate business purpose such as the advisability 
of discipline, dismissal, promotion, or transfer. No other 
Police Department personnel are permitted access to these 
materials at any time. The only exception is an officer under 
investigation may, in certain cases, review the findings of the 
Internal Investigation Section, when there appears to be no basis 
for complaint and confidentialities will not be compromised. 
Private citizens are never allowed to review or to have access to 
these files, even if it is a file compiled pursuant to a 
complaint by that citizen. The files themselves are maintained 
in locked files in the office of the Internal Investigation 
Section and are stamped "Confidential." All of the foregoing 
access procedures are derived from the Police Department's 
overall policy (and the absolute necessity) of treating all such 
investigations and investigation reports as strictly 
confidential. 
12. The Police Department's investigation files often 
contain heresay, gossip, and other remote information from which 
the department hopes to develop leads in its investigation. 
Public disclosure of such trivia and possible falsehoods could 
work grave injury and injustice to those involved in the 
investigation. 
13. It has been affiant's experience that disclosure of the 
internal investigation in any action, including this one, 
seriously impairs internal investigations. It undermines the 
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expectation of police officers and of witnesses that their state-
ments during an internal investigation will always be treated in 
a confidential manner and closes sources of information we must 
have in order to develop leads to keep our department free from 
corruption. 
14. The information which led to the arrest and conviction 
of the police officer bank robbers came from personnel who gave 
information only on the guarantee of confidentiality. Had we not 
been able to give this guarantee, we would have had more 
difficulty in developing leads we needed to break the case. This 
is also true of less spectacular problems. We have been able to 
develop information about an officer's unfitness for the job only 
from leads given by sources who have been promised 
conf identiality. 
15. The possibility of disclosure of the Internal Affairs 
files substantially interferes with the department's ability to 
determine wrongful conduct by its officers. 
16. JJt-is affiant's experience that if citizens believe 
that any complaint they file against a peace officer is freely 
subject to discovery proceedings, they are inhibited in filing 
such complaints and do not come forward with their complaints. 
If citizens are inhibited in filing complaints, it seriously 
prejudices the department's efforts to maintain proper discipline 
and a corruption-free police force. 
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17. Due to the nature of police work and the powers peace 
officers have, it has been affiant's experience that the confi-
dentiality of materials obtained in Internal Affairs acts as a 
significant deterrent to improper police action. This deterent 
can only be maintained if citizens, who know of the unfitness of 
an officer, come forward with their information. 
18. It is affiant's experience that the promise of confi-
dentiality materially promotes citizen involvement as well as 
materially promoting free and candid comments of police officers. 
DATED this ? day of July, 1984. 
E. L. BUD WILLOUGHBY, AFFIANT y 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ day of July, 
1984. 
-t*:. 
NOTARY/PUBLIC, residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah \\ .-.- • 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of E.L. Bud Willoughby to Timothy C. 
Houpt, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 419 Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 841 11
 r by depositing same in the U.S. mail with 
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postage prepaid thereon t h i s *5^ day of Ju ly , 1984 
- / T / / 7 A ( J4 / «., U,,^-<1 J 
cm1 7 
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or misconduct, penalties like in character shall be imposed for like of-
fenses. 
2.2-6 MISCONDUCT 
Among other things, the following shall be grounds for a charge of 
misconduct: 
a. Violation of the Laws of the State of Utah or the ordinances of 
Salt Lake City relating to the conduct and authority of employees. 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Section 25-1-9—Employees 
under Civil Service not to strike or join certain organizations. 
b. The commission of any crime relating to the public morals and 
decency; drunkenness or violation of the liquor laws. 
c. The canmission of any act, or participating in any understanding, 
for the purpose of causing the merit rating of any member in the 
Classified Civil Service to be either unfairly or dishonestly af-
fected by either raising or lowering his rating. 
d. Failure properly to observe the rules and regulations of the Civil 
Service Commission. 
e. Reprehensible or indecent language or conduct tending to bring 
discredit upon the department. 
2 . 2-7 INCOMPETENCY 
Among other things, the following shall be grounds for a charge of 
inconpetency: 
a. Failure to maintain an overall merit rating of satisfactory for 
any one year, under a rating plan approved by the Canmission. 
b. Failure to maintain a satisfactory physical record. 
c. Habitual neglect of personal appearance while on duty. 
d. Cowardice or indolence. 
Compiler's Note: 
Rule 2.2-7 was amended May 27, 1982, and can be found on the Commission's 
minutes. 
2.2-8 FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY 
Among other things, the following shall be grounds for a charge of 
failure in the performance of duty: 
a. Failure in the performance of those duties that are required under 
the law to be performed by the person charged. 
b. Neglect of duty. 
